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The success of state efforts to control rising health care costs depends on the incencontained in the legislative design of regulatory policies and in the administrative capacity and autonomy of state agencies. States have regulated the contives

and expansion of health care facilities and services for more than two
decades through "certificate of need" (CON) programs designed to limit the diffusion of expensive new medical technologies and to avoid the duplication of health
struction

care facilities. Although the cost-control record of state certificate of need programs has been widely criticized, Rhode Island's experience with a reformed CON
process from 1985 to 1995 suggests that properly designed capital expenditure
controls can impose order on the rapid diffusion of

new medical

technologies.

Staunch political opposition from health providers, however, raises serious questions about the ability of state officials to

Rhode

implement such reforms. In the end,

Island's experience with capital expenditure regulation in thel980s

and

1990s underscores the importance of institutional design and policymaking capacity on regulatory performance.

The 1974 passage of the Health Planning and Resource Development Act, Public
Law

late the

93-641, marked the federal government's

first

comprehensive

effort to regu-

behavior of health providers. While earlier federal planning efforts in the 1960s

lacked teeth, PL. 93-641 required hospitals to obtain a certificate of need
state health

(CON) from

planning agencies before undertaking significant capital projects. State

CON programs

required applicants to demonstrate both the need for their projects and

their consistency with goals of an overall health

cess, state planners sought to

system plan. Through the

CON

impose orderly development on the health care

pro-

industry,

expand access for the poor and in geographically underserved regions, reduce duplicate
and underutilized services, and above all, control health care costs. In the eyes of their

CON programs have stifled competition, failed to control costs, and
on access to health care. Opposition from health providers, coupled
with recurring doubts about the cost-control record of state and local planning agencies,
led to the termination of federal support for health planning in 1986. 2 The end of federal
support for health planning produced a range of responses at the state level. Although
some states replaced federal dollars with state funds, and a few states increased their

critics,

had

however,

little

effect

1
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regulatory efforts

by strengthening

existing

CON

statutes, thirteen states

view of

state capital-expenditure controls is

concludes that "the evidence that
objectives

On

very weak."

is

abandoned

The

health planning and certificate of need activities altogether after 1986.

prevailing

summarized by Randall Bovbjerg, who

CON in practice has

accomplished any useful social

3

closer inspection, however, certificate of need programs offer several lessons for

policymakers. The design of regulatory institutions structures the incentives and oppor-

and other interested parties in the regulatory
most instances, the creation of CON programs represented a departure for
the states from their traditional role of licensing health providers to a more active regulatory mode. The development of state CON programs required legislatures and health
tunities for state officials, industry groups,

process. In

bureaucracies to rethink the limits of public authority and to develop
ties.

As

new

state capaci-

such, state efforts to control health care costs through capital-expenditure con-

trols afford

an opportunity to examine the impact of institutional design on policy de-

velopment and implementation.
Beginning in 1984, Rhode Island established an aggregate ceiling on capital costs

known

subject to certificate of need review,

as the

CONCAP,

hospital capital expenditures and rationalize the diffusion of

in an effort to control

new medical

technologies.

Despite a documented record of cost containment, a proposal to eliminate the
capital budget

executive branch, the hospital industry, and third-party insurers a decade after
duction.

We

state's

cap passed the General Assembly with broad-based support from the

explore the political evolution and programmatic success of

its

intro-

CON in Rhode

Island through the use of data from a series of semistructured, open-ended interviews

with public and private officials conducted during the
All the participants in the state's
Cross,

Ocean

CON process,

summer and

fall

of 1992.

including representatives of Blue

State Physicians' Health Plan, the Hospital Association of

the state Health Services Council, and the state

Rhode

Department of Health agreed

Island,

to

be

interviewed for this project. To assure their expression of their candid opinions, respondents were guaranteed anonymity. Data on the performance of state

CON programs

over the past decade and state and national data on the fiscal health of the hospital in-

Rhode Island's cost-control record in both a regional
and a national context. In retrospect, the rise and demise of Rhode Island's innovative
controls on capital expenditures for health care providers illustrate the constraints fac-

dustry are also included to place

ing state regulatory agencies in an uncertain political and fiscal environment.

A Framework

for Analyzing State Cost-Containment

Programs

In recent years, the rediscovery of institutions within mainstream political science has

underscored the significance of program design in structuring policy outcomes. 4 The
design of the regulatory process and the scope of state enabling legislation shape both
the politics and the performance of state

general

CON

CON programs.

der specific and favorable conditions

it

may

rise

tions, in particular, influence the effectiveness
First, the

As Lawrence Brown

labors under heavy burdens as a cost constraining technique, but

above

its liabilities."

5

notes, "In
.

.

.

un-

Several condi-

of state controls on capital expenditures.

presence, and level, of threshold requirements for reviewing capital projects,

from CON review, affects
by limiting the number of
regulatory approval. Where review thresholds are high, only major

for example, exempting projects costing less than $1 million

the ability of state regulators to control capital-related costs
projects subject to

54

renovations or construction require state review. Conversely,
set too low, state regulators are

if

the review threshold

is

vulnerable to charges of micromanaging institutions, as

even minor repairs or service enhancements, such as upgrading existing telephone systems, are subject to regulatory oversight. In 1992, review thresholds for hospital capital

New England ranged from $300,000 in Vermont to $8.5 million in MassaWhile several states required that all new equipment purchases undergo a
CON review, others exempted purchases of less than SI million.
Second, state CON programs can also foster discipline by establishing a budget constraint for decision makers; in an open-ended system, regulators have few incentives to
challenge the prerogatives of providers backed by supportive community groups. 7 A
projects in
chusetts.

ceiling

6

on

capital costs forces decision

makers to

regulatory process under a capital cap

and approve only

prioritize projects

those that offer the highest relative benefits. Unlike an open-ended

CON

process, the

becomes a zero-sum game for providers

in

which

the approval of an additional proposal automatically reduces the pool of funds available
to other institutions.

As David Young

argues, "the failure of

CON programs

to control

8
costs is largely because of lack of competition for a limited pool of resources."

Third, the success or failure of hospital regulatory efforts in controlling systemwide
costs also depends

on the number of payers or providers subject

to regulatory review. If

only acute-care hospitals are required to participaate in certificate of need review,
nonhospital providers, such as freestanding surgical centers, dialysis centers, diagnostic

imaging

facilities,

and similar ventures, may gain a competitive advantage

mines support for the system. Furthermore, unless
providers, states find

it

CON

that under-

controls apply to nonhospital

impossible to control systemwide health care costs, for physi-

cians and hospitals have an incentive to shift care to unregulated nonhospital settings.

Since the scope of state regulatory powers

makers to contain costs through

defined by statute, the ability of policy-

is

certificate of

need review

is

ultimately a political ques-

tion.

Fourth, the external environment in which regulatory programs operate affects both
their

performance and their long-term prospects for survival. 9 The continuation of

health planning and certificate of need programs in

more than

expiration of federal support for health planning in 1987

is

thirty-five states after the

a puzzle, for both state and

federal policymakers have increasingly favored market-oriented solutions rather than

regulatory ones over the past decade. State

CON programs

must balance the competing

and often contradictory expectations of service consumers with the needs of resource
providers

who

sustain their activities. 10 This

dependence on external resources leaves

whose long-term interests
woes of many state
governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s produced an annual ritual in which agencies scrambled to cope with threatened (or actual) cuts by squeezing out inefficiencies
or identifying new revenue sources. 12 Although the statutory recognition granted to

public officials at the mercy of potentially hostile groups
conflict with the state's desire to control costs.

government agencies, coupled with

11

The

recurring fiscal

their established relationships with legislators

and

support from clientele groups interested in controlling health care costs, for example,
third-party insurers, favor organizational survival,

vulnerable.

13

As

CON

programs remain extremely

regulatory programs that must wrestle with complex issues, state

CON

controls are typically low in salience for the public at large. 14 Furthermore, since capital

expenditure regulation impinges on the managerial autonomy of health providers,

programs often find themselves with few supporters and many
Finally, the administrative capacity of state regulatory
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15
impact on policy outcomes. Specialized knowledge and expertise have become
prerequisites for the development of effective regulatory policies in the health care

industry.

The complexities of

the contemporary hospital reimbursement process,

coupled with the inherent difficulty in objectively evaluating the "need" for new health
care facilities and sophisticated

new medical

sion-making process that

on

relies

technologies, foster a technocratic deci-

data, forecasts,

Many

and evidence of

clinical

outcomes. 16

of state govern-

observers, however, remain openly
ments to compete effectively with well-financed interest groups and policy think tanks
17
Skeptics suggest
in developing and modeling the impact of various policy choices.
skeptical about the ability

that the limited administrative capacity of

American

political institutions, particularly

those at the subnational level, represents a formidable obstacle to effective policy making. State legislatures

and bureaucracies were regarded for decades as backwaters of

cronyism and patronage

While times have changed, and

politics.

state

governments are

increasingly sophisticated in their ability to draft, implement, and evaluate policy
choices, the development of state administrative capacities remains uneven. In
states, policy

development

lies in

some

the hands of quasi-academic think tanks or working

groups in which well-educated, highly trained professional policy analysts apply the
tools of their trade to developing

and assessing various policy options. In other

states,

acquiring professionally staffed agencies remains a goal, not a reality, as key appoint-

ments are made without regard

The professionalism and

to policy expertise or prior experience in the field.

expertise of state agencies, however,

sources available for hiring and retaining talented
state

compensation and the level of

institutional capacity over time.

staff support

staff.

18

emerge

depend on the

re-

In particular, the adequacy of
as critical issues for building

Unless they can compete for talent with the private

by paying comparable salaries, regulatory agencies find it difficult, if not imposemployees with professional training in law, public policy, and
health economics. Once hired, professionally trained staff must have sufficient resources like space and administrative and computing support to compete with privatesector lobbying groups and think tanks. In the absence of these essential resources, state
regulatory agencies are likely to serve as stepping-stones to the private sector, which
offers the most capable employees a chance to hone their skills before moving up to
more lucrative opportunities outside state government. 19
Widespread departures from its top management positions can leave a regulatory
sector

sible, to hire skilled

agency without a clear sense of direction, hardly a situation predisposed to the develop-

ment and implementation of innovative public
Morone's case study of hospital rate setting in

policies. Sapolsky, Aisenberg,

New

Jersey concluded that

and

"it is less

bring together a talented group for designing a new program than to hold
one together for the arduous task of program implementation and refinement. The reward for even a brief association with an interesting project is often a much better posidifficult to

tion elsewhere." 20

stage
is

is set

When

a

state's

resources are overwhelmed by the private sector, the

for interest groups to dominate the regulatory process. Leadership stability

also vital for the ongoing success of state regulation. Effective leaders can energize

an organization by clearly defining a unifying sense of purpose and mission and by
mobilizing support for their goals among significant external constituencies. 21 Leadership can take

many

forms, from charismatic public salesmanship to behind-the-scenes

efforts at coalition building. In either case,

create uncertainty
priorities.

among

client

however, frequent changes in leadership can

groups concerning the agency's direction and policy

Under such circumstances,

legislative leaders

56

and

interest

group representa-

tives are reluctant to

new

make long-term commitments to support the agency's agenda, for
may pursue a quite different agenda. 22 As a

leaders or an interim administration

result, short-term administrators face

—

if

in their positions

cult, if

not impossible, to back

new

groups or units in

regulatory initiatives.

career advancement in

among

some

states, in other states legislators serve

members

staff

degree

only part time for

have developed

state legislatures

highly differentiated committee systems that foster specialization

have not. 23 The extent of

working

in their

a full-time job with possibilities for

is

pay and few perks. In addition, while some

bers, others

distinct

government. State legislatures vary considerably

state

of institutionalization. While legislative service

among

their

mem-

support for both committees and individual

also influences the ability of legislators to serve as proactive players in policy

development. 24 Part-time legislatures with limited

committees find

it

more

difficult to

staff

support and few specialized

develop and oversee specialized regulatory pro-

grams than full-time legislatures with narrowly defined committee
cadre of personal and committee staff.

The

to

diffi-

it

specialization of state policymaking expertise includes both the degree of insti-

tutionalization in a state legislature and the division of labor

little

them

others do not expect

long enough to carry out their stated goals, they find

remain

The

a credibility gap

Political Evolution of Certificate of

Need

Although many groups have supported health
the past three decades, each had

its

own

in

and a

Rhode Island

facilities

vision of

jurisdictions

how

planning in Rhode Island over

As a
home to

the process should work.

small state with a population of just over one million persons,

Rhode

Island

is

eleven acute-care hospitals, four of which are located in the capital city of Providence.

The Rhode

Island Department of

of every nine workers in the
Island's hospitals are a

Employment Training and

state is

major force

employed

Security estimates that one

in the health care industry.

in the state's

Rhode

economy. Data provided by the Hospi-

Association of Rhode Island (HARI) indicated that the state's hospitals employed
more than 23,000 people in 1994; Rhode Island Hospital (a founding member of the
Lifespan hospital network) is the state's largest private employer. Over the past two
decades, the hospital industry has emerged as one of the state's most influential lobbying groups whose paid lobbyists develop and track legislation affecting its membertal

ship, testify at hearings,

member

association's

CON process
political

Rhode

and coordinate grassroots lobbying campaigns with the

hospitals.

During the 1980s, hospitals grew displeased with the

and chafed under the

state's strict capital

Island's legislature served only part time

efforts;

expenditure controls.

HARI's

advantages were compounded by the fact that until 1994 the 150 members of

with

little

and received only $5.00 a day for their

professional staff support available to individual

members and com-

on testimony and information provided by

mittees, legislators are forced to rely heavily

interested parties in formulating legislation. 25

During the past decade, Rhode Island
states,

made

hospitals, like their counterparts in other

a difficult adjustment from a system of retrospective, cost-based reim-

bursement to one
quoted charges.

in

By

which providers are paid prospectively or
the end of the 1980s, however,

Rhode

at

a steep discount from

Island hospitals were in a

precarious fiscal position. For example, they were found to have relatively low levels of
financial liquidity

when

they were compared with similar U.S. institutions. 26

They

ranked forty-sixth in the nation in days of cash on hand and forty-seventh in their
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overall operating margin.

27

Capital spending particularly

fell far

behind both national

and regional averages, although Rhode Island's teaching hospitals had the eighth highest number of medical residents per thousand members of the population in the United
States in the late 1980s.

28

Rhode

Prior to the mid-1980s,

Island's hospital industry

had not witnessed the

tense competition that accompanied the expansion of for-profit hospital chains,

in-

man-

aged care, and alternative delivery systems. Until that time, the private health insurance
market was dominated by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, which insured

more than 85 percent of

the population not covered

by government-sponsored programs

like Medicare and Medicaid despite modest inroads by two fledgling

Cross, in turn,

was a key player

in the state's prospective rate-setting

HMOs. 29

Blue

program, which

determined both individual hospital budgets and an overall ceiling on hospital expenditures each year.

No

preferred provider organizations operated in the state during the

1970s and 1980s. While four ambulatory surgical centers were licensed during the
1980s, two were limited to providing abortion services and gynecological surgery. Fur-

thermore, no for-profit hospitals or national hospital chains currently operate hospitals
in

Rhode

Island, although both

institutions in

Columbia/HCA and Tenet proposed

Roger Williams Medical Center
cal Center

Rhode

still

to acquire nonprofit

1996 and 1997. While Columbia/HCA's controversial bid
failed, Tenet's

to purchase

proposed merger with Landmark Medi-

awaits regulatory approval.

Island health planning has a long history dating back to the mid-1960s; pri-

vate planning efforts predated the passage of federal and state certificate of need legis-

have favored private planning initiatives that do not threaten
autonomy and opposed planning functions lodged within the Department of Health
as unnecessary intrusions on medical practice. In 1968, Rhode Island became the second state in the nation to regulate hospital capital projects. The legislature's decision to
regulate capital construction won the endorsement of the hospital industry and a special
legislative commission appointed to study the rapid increase in hospital charges during
the 1960s. At the time, hospitals viewed CON as a less onerous alternative to state rate
lation. In general, hospitals

their

setting despite the inherent risks involved in ceding regulatory authority to the state.

Hospitals also favored

CON as

a

system, for "providers have seen

means to limit competition in the state's health care
some merit in entry barriers as a means of turf protec-

and therefore have generally given CON at least their tacit support." 30 Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, for its part, enthusiastically supported facilities plan-

tion

ning as a means to control

two decades. As the state's dominant
to hold more than 70 percent of the
nongovernment health insurance market in the early 1990s despite recent inroads by the
state's two largest health maintenance organizations, United Health Care (formerly
Ocean State Physicians' Health Plan) and Harvard Community Health Plan of New
England, formerly the Rhode Island Group Health Association. Unlike neighboring
states like Massachusetts, however, few business groups and other third-party payers
played a major role in health care policy debates during the 1980s and 1990s. 31
In the early 1970s, Rhode Island's fledgling health planning programs received a
significant boost as a result of the federal government's decision to embrace health
planning and certificate of need as its principal cost-control strategy. Under an amendment sponsored by Senator Claiborne Pell, the state was exempt from requirements
mandating local citizen planning boards to assess the need for proposed projects in the
context of statewide health plans. As a result, funds that were channeled to local health

third-party health insurer,

its

costs in the past

Blue Cross continued

58

systems agencies

in

other states were allocated to the

Health (DOH), generating a windfall to support

Rhode

Island Department of

nascent planning activities. The

its

department's early initiatives reflected a strong commitment to rational planning but

showed

little

sensitivity to the political ramifications of its policy prescriptions. This

political naivete was reflected in the development of the state's

first

comprehensive

health plan, which proposed a radical restructuring of health care delivery. The draft
health plan that was released to the public in 1980 immediately agitated providers,

which drummed up support

communities

in their local

to

meet the perceived

threat.

The

plan proposed, for example, to eliminate "excess capacity" in the state's hospital bed

supply and to

restrict the

number of surgeons who could

practice in the state. 32

ees and patients of hospitals targeted for closure or service reductions

jammed

Employpublic

hearings across the state to plead their case. 33

The public forums about

the draft health plan were raucous affairs that

dreds of local residents; at one meeting in southern
called to escort the planners out of

town

after a

Rhode

tumultuous hearing during which angry

residents charged that the state's proposal to close "surplus" hospitals

As one

layoffs for hundreds of local residents.

early years
cles, just

we

didn't

know what we were

doing;

we

state's hospital industry

result in

"In the

didn't look at the political obsta-

subsequent plans of the

reality,

more controversial proposals. Rather than
promote competition among health providers to

DOH elected to

decertifying beds, the

transform the

would

DOH senior planner recalled,

our rational models." After a dose of political

department backed away from some of

drew hunwere

Island, local police

its

during the 1980s. In the decade after the publica-

and service
by nearly 13

tion of the state's first draft health plan, a combination of mergers, closures,

conversions reduced the

from 3,461

percent,

in

number of

1980

licensed

Rhode

to 3,015 in 1993.

Island hospital beds

34

Imposing Competition from Above

By

the early 1980s, a

planning [had] made

though the

state's

growing body of evidence suggested
little

that

"CON

laws and health

difference in costs, quality, or access to health care." 35 Al-

CON process provided for a case by

case review of proposed capital

on the number of new capital
had a limited impact on systemwide costs. The limitations of
Rhode Island's existing CON legislation were readily apparent during the debate over
an application from Women & Infants' Hospital in Providence to replace its aging facility in the early 1980s. As one senior hospital administrator recalled, "No one had ever
envisioned the replacement of a hospital, but dropping out of the sky was a $50 million
project." In response, officials at the Department of Health called for efforts to
strengthen the CON process by imposing a statewide capital budget cap on all new
on the

projects

projects,

basis of need, in the absence of limitations

CON controls

construction projects. 36

The department's proposal

to strengthen the

CON process won

the endorsement of a special legislative commission, chaired by state representative

Anthony

Carceri, to study health care capital expenditures. In

its

1982 report

to the

General Assembly, the commission argued that the "health care system, like individuals,

must be held more closely

to the discipline of a budget." In 1984, both

chambers

endorsed a statewide capital expenditure limit with unanimous support for the Health

Care System Affordability Act (84-H-7103) despite opposition from HARI.

Two

factors played a significant role in the legislature's decision to

of certificate of need in Rhode Island. The

DOH
59

expand the scope

enjoyed unusual influence and prestige
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within the state bureaucracy as an agency that provided unbiased and sophisticated
analyses. Federal planning funds,

and early 1980s, enabled the

which exceeded $1 million per year in the late 1970s
hire a cadre of planners and policy analysts to

DOH to

develop a number of innovative databases on health care costs, utilization, and out-

comes. In addition, the department enjoyed strong support during the 1980s from several prominent legislators and from the executive branch, which added legitimacy to its
policy recommendations.

As one

DOH

senior

official noted, these relationships

"helped

a great deal in terms of support for our budgets and proposed legislation."

The Health Care System

Affordability Act established a statewide ceiling

capital expenditure projects. Under the

approved by the

state's

CONCAP,

each

certificate

on hospital

of need application

Health Services Council (HSC) reduced the amount available

all projects under review was
amount negotiated annually by the hospital association, Blue Cross, and the state Medicaid program. After 1984, all CON applications
subject to CONCAP review were evaluated in a single batch each year to foster a
comparison of each proposal. In addition to establishing a ceiling on total capital ex-

for other projects; the cost of interest and depreciation for

not allowed to exceed the

CONCAP

penditures in 1984, the enabling legislation required the
(1)

new

facilities in

HSC

to review proposals for

excess of $600,000, (2) increases of ten or more acute-care beds or

10 percent of existing capacity, (3) the addition of services that increase operating ex-

penses by $250,000 or more, and (4) the acquisition of health care equipment requiring

an expenditure of more than $400,000. 37 Finally, the 1984 legislation directed the

HSC

to first

state's

review applications on the basis of need and then rank order each on the

was completed, each project would
was exhausted. The Health Services Council, however, was not required to fully deplete the CONCAP negotiated by
the participants in the state's prospective reimbursement program
Blue Cross, the
state's hospital association, and Medicaid. Each certificate of need approval reduced the
amount available for other projects, thus creating a zero-sum game among applicants.
The actual dollar limit of the CONCAP reflects the estimated cost of the annual capitalbasis of

its

relative merit. After this priority ranking

be approved in order

until the

annual

CONCAP budget

—

related operating expenditures, interest, depreciation,

and leasehold expenses negotiated

during the state's prospective rate-setting process.

Rhode Island's amended CON process was designed to determine both the public
need and the affordability for each proposal. The initial review of a project is usually
conducted by one of the Office of Health System Development's two project review
committees, which make written recommendations to the full Health Services Council.
The

HSC

has the option of approving, rejecting, or modifying a proposal.

recommendation

is

then forwarded to the director of

Although the director

is

free to accept or reject the

HSC

The

HSC

for a final determination.

recommendation, few of the

council's decisions have been overturned.

Two

other types of review are designed to

make

the

CON process

responsive to both routine and unusual needs. Applicants

may

more

flexible

and

apply for expeditious

review of projects that are designed to meet emergencies and other urgent public health
needs.

The

CON

statute also provides for an accelerated review of projects that present

a prima facie demonstration of need and affordability, for example, in the case of
projects proposing a one-for-one replacement of equipment. Projects approved under an

CONCAP priority listing procedure, and they
draw first from the amount budgeted by CONCAP. Both forms of priority
review have been criticized by providers for offering an unfair advantage to some appliaccelerated review are not subject to the
are allowed to

60

cants, for institutions able to

demonstrate that their projects

fit

the criteria for either

expeditious or accelerated consideration leapfrog over other projects on the

HSC's

pri-

ority ranking scale.

The Success of

CON

Current perceptions of

in

Rhode Island

CON's

failure as a cost-control strategy are largely

based on

assessments of program performance during the 1970s. Previous efforts to measure

CON program

performance have been criticized for their inability to show that the

imposition of capital controls

made a

penditures or the fiscal condition of

difference in either a state's level of capital ex-

its

sion to the percentage of projects that

Rhode

Island's

hospitals.

38

Most

studies confined their discus-

were approved, denied, modified, or withdrawn. 39

CON process became more stringent after the adoption of the CONCAP;
CON applications fell from 84 percent in the five years

the overall approval rate for

40
preceding 1984 to less than 70 percent from 1985 to 1990. Between 1990 and 1992,

the state Health Services Council approved twenty of the twenty-fix
it

CON

applications

received from hospitals, but denied petitions to construct a bone-marrow transplant

facility

and additional cardiac catheterization laboratories. Savings from hospital

projects that
tal

costs

were

either modified, denied, or

and $25 million

withdrawn exceeded $68 million

in annual operating costs

from 1971

While Rhode Island compares favorably with other
measurements of process say

little

to 1986.

in capi-

41

states in this regard (see

Table

1),

about a program's effectiveness. Other indicators,

including equity financing ratios, occupancy rates, and capital-expense ratios, offer

CON on hospitals' capital-related operating costs.
by the Health Services Council from 1984 to 1994 reduced hospitals'
interest expenses by increasing institutions' equity participation, or "down payment," on
new projects to nearly 40 percent of total approved capital expenditures. 42 A higher
percentage of equity funding, in turn, constrains costs by reducing the expenses associ-

better

measures of the impact of

Projects approved

ated with servicing capital debts.

Various indicators of hospitals' fiscal health can be used to gauge the impact of

Rhode

CON programs can affect hospital investCON review may deny institutions' applications to

Island capital-expenditure controls, for

ment patterns

in several ways. First,

Table 1

CON

Application Review Outcomes, Selected States
Withdrawn,
Denied, or

Approved (%)

State (years)

Maine (1982-1992)
New Hampshire (1982-1991)
Rhode Island (1 979-1 983)*
Rhode Island (1984-1992)
Vermont (1984-1993)

295 (81.0)
69 (77.5)
47 (83.9)
47 (72.3)
117 (88.6)

Health;

Island Office of Health

N

69
20
9
18
15

(19.0)

364

(22.5)
(27.7)

89
56
65

(11.4)

132

(16.1)

Human Services; New Hampshire Health Services;
Systems Development; Rhode Island Department of

Sources: Maine Department of

Rhode

Modified (%)

and Vermont Health Care Authority.
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CON

add equipment, or expand services, resulting in a savings of both
and ongoing operating costs associated with the proposed project. Second,
approval may be conditional, in that hospitals may be required to modify their

initial

proposal by lowering costs, meeting well-defined national standards, guarantee-

build

new

facilities,

capital costs

ing access to underserved populations and the uninsured, and fulfilling other goals defined by the review panel. Furthermore, "the very existence of certificate of need acts as

a deterrent to frivolous or obviously misdirected projects.

Few

institutions are likely to

expend the time, energy, and money to traverse the complex certificate of need process
43
for a project which cannot withstand the test of public scrutiny."
New England hospiof
capital-related
costs
for
A comparison of various indicators
tals is

shown

in Table 2. Capital-related costs for

Rhode

Island's eleven acute-care hos-

pitals fell well below national and regional averages in the decade following the

enactment of the

CONCAP. The

capital-expense ratio describes the cost of interest and

depreciation relative to an institution's total operating expenses, since higher values for
the ratio indicate a higher level of indebtedness and lower values are indicative of both
fiscal health

and fewer long-term obligations. The median capital expense ratio for state
was the lowest in the region and the second lowest in the United States

hospitals (0.05)

in 1992, indicating that the state's hospitals had an unusually
to their counterparts in other states.

44

The second column

low

level of debt relative

in Table 2 presents the

median

values of hospitals' debt- service-coverage ratio, which measures institutions' ability to

repay the costs of both interest charges and principal payments. Higher values indicate
a greater ability to meet their financing commitments; the debt-service ratio

is

also the

most important indicator of debt capacity used by bond- rating agencies. 45 While
the median debt-service-coverage ratio for Rhode Island hospitals exceeded the national
median, the state ranked fourth among its New England neighbors. The state's relatively
poor performance on this indicator, however, is not owing to high levels of capital
single

investment but to the fact that Rhode Island hospitals have a low net income relative to
institutions in other states as a result of the high proportion

patients served

The
ness of

by the

of Medicare and Medicaid

state's nonprofit institutions.

utilization rate of health care facilities also provides insight into the effective-

Rhode

Island's strengthened capital-expenditure review process. Since

programs subject proposed capital investments and service changes

to a

CON

comprehensive

Table 2

Hospital Capital Expenditures in

New England,

1992

Capital

Debt

Equity

Expense

Service

Financing

State

Ratio

Coverage

Ratio

Connecticut

Rhode Island
Vermont

0.057
0.071
0.084
0.088
0.050
0.074

Median

0.079

Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire

U.S.

4.36

0.720
0.503
0.316
0.492
0.507
0.589

3.16

0.535

5.57

2.96

2.54
4.40
3.23

Source: W. Cleverly, 1993 Almanac of Hospital Financial and Operating Indicators
(Columbus, Ohio: Center for Healthcare Industry Performance Studies, 1993).
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review process, states with effective
average, a

Rhode

more

efficient use

CON programs

of existing

facilities.

would be expected

to have,

on

Despite growing competition in

and a national trend toward lower utilizamedian occupancy rate for Rhode Island's acute-care
hospitals exceeded both the regional and national medians. The state's median occupancy rate of 68.9 percent was the fifth highest in the nation in 1992. The high utilizaIsland's health insurance marketplace

tion of inpatient services, the

tion of existing health care facilities reflects the fact that

Rhode

Island did not experi-

ence a surge in the construction of ambulatory surgical centers, freestanding imaging
centers,

grams

and new hospital

facilities

following the termination of federal planning pro-

in 1987.

In addition, because projects

break ground or add

new

must pass more

should be older than their counterparts in other

CON

controls in

Rhode
all

states.

CON

programs

Again, evidence indicates that

Island have had a demonstrable effect.

state's acute-care hospitals, 9.51 years, is

and the median of

stringent tests before institutions can

services, hospitals in states with aggressive

The median age of the

considerably higher than the national median

other states in the region except Connecticut. In 1992, the average

age of Rhode Island's hospitals' fixed assets was the third oldest in the nation. 46

The

effectiveness of

Rhode

Island's certificate of

need process can be traced

to a

steady expansion of the scope of projects subject to regulatory review. In 1978 the law

was amended to include most other health providers, including freestanding ambulatory
and surgical centers. Debates over the construction of the latter particularly proved to
be highly controversial in recent years, as the director has rejected proposals to build
additional for-profit centers in the state because of concerns about an existing overca-

pacity of outpatient surgical facilities and the potential impact of "cream
the centers on the financial stability of existing institutions.

Change and Continuity
Rhode

in

Rhode

CON

Island's

Island's success in controlling capital outlays

Program
would be expected

the opposition of providers to the capital-review process and increase

an uncertain

fiscal climate.

Although hospitals

skimming" by

initially

supported

to strengthen

its

CON

vulnerability in

as a less oner-

ous alternative to rate-setting controls, by the mid-1980s the process significantly

cumscribed

institutions'

CONCAP process

cir-

managerial autonomy. Hospitals strongly objected to the

on the grounds

that

a changing market for health services.

it

unnecessarily limited their freedom to react to

CONCAP

survived for nearly a decade without

major revisions through strong support from both the legislature and the senior manage-

ment of the Department of Health. From 1987
several largely technical changes in the

portant concession in 1991

when

to 1992, the General

CON law.

Assembly made

Health care providers gained an im-

the length of the review process

days (91-H-6712). The legislature also limited the scope of the

was capped

at

CON program by

the financial thresholds for projects subject to review (91-H-6652) and

120
raising

by exempting

and home health care providers from the process. In 1993, the legislaexempted new state health care facilities from CON review (93-S-499). The

certain nursing
ture also

legislature,
facilities

however, refused to approve wholesale exemptions for cancer treatment

(91-S-1073) and for repeal of fees for

5599).
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CON reviews for equipment

(91-H-
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challenge facing organizations

critical

start-up to successful implementation.

gram

ticularly vulnerable to

47

lies in

managing the

transition

from pro-

government bureaucracies are par-

State

problems of program implementation, because budget

cuts, inter-

group opposition, and lucrative opportunities in the private sector often lead to a
revolving door through which employees use state employment as a training ground for
est

better-paying private- sector jobs. Innovative state programs are often victims of their

own

success, for "the presentation of

new

ideas often brings the designers widespread

The reward for
and career opportunities to serve in a larger jurisdiction
creativity draws talent away from state government at the point when ideas are being
implemented and refined." 48 The Department of Health's tendency to promote from
attention

.

within was a critical element in preserving

development of an

institutional

memory

its

commitment

to

.

.

CON,

for

it

promoted the

rooted in health planning. During the 1980s

DOH managed to attract and retain talented administrators and analysts
and refine the CON process. Senior department officials drew upon the cadre

and 1990s, the
to oversee

of health planners that developed the
ship roles.

By

state's health plans in the

ing the deputy director, the associate director for health
office oversees the

opment had

1970s to assume leader-

management team, includservices regulation, whose

the early 1990s, several officials in the senior

CON program,

fifteen or

more

and the chief of the Office of Health Systems Devel-

years' experience with health planning

and

facilities regula-

tion.

Political support for

economy stumbled

CON,

however, eroded in the early 1990s.

into a recession, state agencies

were forced

to

As Rhode

Island's

cope with successive

rounds of budget cuts, personnel layoffs, and furloughs. 49 The Hospital Association of

Rhode

Island, for

its part,

had sought

to

modify the

CONCAP law

since

its

passage,

arguing that the statewide expenditure ceiling "could constrain the retooling process

necessary for hospitals to adjust to the

new

[competitive] environment."

HARI's 1988

Environmental Assessment for the Hospitals of Rhode Island noted "growing disillusionment with many aspects of certificate of need and particularly with the CONCAP

program" among

its

members. 50

The ongoing opposition of

the health care industry

was amplified by a growing

anti-

regulatory sentiment in the state's business community. Business leaders had been ex-

pressing a concern over the antibusiness reputation of the state, which,
believed, adversely affected the state's ability to attract

new

it

was widely

industry and investment.

The Rhode Island Public Expenditure Council, a watchdog group supported by

several

of the state's largest employers, repeatedly cited unwarranted government regulation as

CON process was
by political rather than policy considerations. 51 In 1992 and 1993,
viewed proposals to build freestanding surgical centers in three cities as

detrimental to the state economy. In addition, critics charged that the
increasingly driven
local hospitals

a direct threat to their survival. Several hospital mergers and compacts contributed to a
climate of uncertainty in the hospital industry and brought the Health Services Council
into the public limelight.

The HSC had always been a politically sensitive body. Fifteen of its twenty-two
members are appointed by either the governor or the leaders of the General Assembly.
Although members are not appointed for set terms and can be replaced any time, the
council was seldom subject to overt political pressure. One hospital vice president commented in 1992 that "the process was always political, but it was discrete. Now it seems
that anything goes." In 1993, a total of nine HSC members
41 percent of its total
membership
were replaced. The timing of the appointments also raised questions. In

—

—
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June 1993, two members were abruptly replaced amid a heated discussion over a proposal to build a rehabilitation hospital in Warwick. Less than six months

later,

three

members were replaced during an acrimonious debate over a proposed outpatient surgical center in the town of Johnston. The HSC itself may have added to the perception of
undue

political influence

ible objectives. In

by issuing decisions based on what appeared

approving one proposed surgical center

in

to be

Providence, the

sought to promote consumer choice and competition. Several month

later,

incompat-

HSC

the council

rejected a proposed surgical center in Johnston, citing concerns about the effects of

competition on

St.

Joseph Hospital. This struggle was played out before an increasingly

cynical public that had recently witnessed several major scandals involving highly

placed

officials,

including the former governor, the chief justice, and the chief court

administrator.

In 1994 Governor Bruce Sundlun asked the director of

modify the

CON

DOH to prepare

legislation to

process. According to Peter Dennehy, the governor's principal health

was increasingly concerned about the state's
governor viewed CON as a burden
for one of the few growth industries in the state. After a series of meetings between the
DOH staff and the governor's office, the Sundlun administration drafted legislation that
significantly revised the CON process by eliminating the CONCAP. The bill, 94-S2841, was introduced as part of the governor's legislative package and passed the Senmargin and the House by 75 to in June, ending Rhode Island's experiate by a 45 to
ment with global budgeting for hospital capital expenditures ten years after it began.
Although the types of projects subject to review by the Health Services Council remains
essentially unchanged, the number of projects eligible for approval under the revised
statute is unlimited. In the words of a former DOH official, the General Assembly's
action, at the governor's request, had "pulled the teeth of the CON program."
policy adviser, the Sundlun administration

slow rate of economic growth. In

The

rise

this climate, the

and demise of Rhode Island's reformed

CON process

lessons for other states. First and perhaps foremost,

Rhode

offers several useful

Island's

CON

program dem-

onstrates the effectiveness, if not the necessity, of a budget cap for controlling health

care providers' capital expenditures. In particular, opportunities to "outmaneuver" the

Rhode

Island's

CONCAP in

CON process were sharply curtailed after the introduction of the
A ceiling on capital costs forces decision makers to prioritize

1984.

pro-

grams and choose the most cost-effective projects. Since the merits of each application
are judged relative to others, capital caps place much greater emphasis on the opportunity costs of forgone projects. Unlike an open-ended CON process in which an unlimited number of projects could be approved if they demonstrated need, the CONCAP emphasis on statewide affordability created a zero-sum game for providers. Under these
circumstances, the approval of an additional proposal automatically reduced the funds
available for other institutions' projects.

Second, although the effectiveness of
sonnel gain experience and sharpen their

CON programs can
skills,

improve with age

succeed in the face of opposition from the regulated industry depends on the
tional capacity of the

CON programs

as per-

the ability of any regulatory initiative to
institu-

implementing agency. 52 In the long run, the effectiveness of

depends on their

institutional capacity of state

ability to recruit

CON

and

retain

state

key personnel. Building the

programs, however, requires a commitment from

policymakers inside and outside the implementing agency. 53 The

65

fiscal crisis that beset
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Rhode

the

Policy

Island state government in the early 1990s buffeted the

DOH even though the

program had a stable source of funding from providers' application fees. Furloughs,
wage and hiring freezes, and restrictions on the purchase of new equipment contributed
to sagging morale among program personnel. In addition, turnover had a significant
impact on the Office of Health Systems Development after the end of federal support
for health planning. Although Rhode Island had assembled an impressive health planning and regulatory infrastructure during the 1970s and 1980s, the state did not replace
federal health planning funds after the repeal of

RL. 93-641. Without continued fund-

ing, several experienced planners and regulators

left for

jobs in the private sector; others

stayed with the department and received promotions to senior management positions.
The CON program managed to retain a core group of experienced analysts but was

unable to replace those

emerged

who

after legislative

departed. Simultaneously,

new

productivity

demands

changes in 1991 shortened the review period from 210 to 120

days.
Providers, for their part, used their considerable resources to outlast the Department

of Health via an incremental approach to the review process. Several institutions reapsuccessfully for

plied

CON approval

after

addressing the comments and critiques raised

by the Health Services Council and program staff during the review of the initial application. Rhode Island DOH staffers do not dispute the fact that those who reapply often
win approval, but they nevertheless defend the process. As one senior policymaker
noted,

"Sometimes tenacity pays

off. It's

not necessarily because the

CON process has
A

been worn down, but because we're disseminating technology in a planned way."

may be

singular focus on the rate of project denials

accompany
expand access to

CON review process

tions that

the

that

services or lower

counterproductive, for the delibera-

often lead to concessions by providers

program operating

costs. Modifications, not

merely rejections or withdrawals, must be seen as significant successes for
grams, particularly

if

CON pro-

they increase hospitals' equity participation in proposed projects

or lead to reductions in staffing and operational costs.
In other cases, however, state officials were handicapped
that

by the program guidelines

had been established through collaborative planning arrangements. In 1993, for

DOH was forced to

approve two competing proposals to establish cardiac
two Providence hospitals. The approvals came despite
concerns about the duplication of facilities and the clinical appropriateness of existing
procedures because both applicants had met the formal criteria established by the state's
Cardiac Care Advisory Committee (CCAC) in the mid-1980s. Under the criteria established by the CCAC, a hospital could demonstrate that a proposed catheterization lab
was "needed" if the applicant's existing labs were operating at more than 90 percent of
example, the

catheterization laboratories at

their

designed capacity and the utilization rate for

80 percent. The

CCAC, which was

all facilities

in the system

heavily dominated by cardiac surgeons

sympathetic to calls for expanded capacity,

made

it

exceeded

who were

impossible for the Health Services

Council to reject projects on the basis of need, although several design and financing
issues led both institutions to reapply after the

HSC

rejected their initial proposals in

1992.

The

and executive branch consistently supported CON in Rhode Island
mid-1990s despite growing opposition from health providers. Although

legislature

until the

changes in party control often lead to policy
first

shifts, the 1984 election of Rhode Island's
Republican governor in more than a decade had a negligible impact on DOH's

activities. Instead,

department funding was nonideological and nonpartisan. In addition,
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the active participation of such respected former legislators as Representative

Carceri on the state Health Services Council provided

The retirement of
the

CON

Anthony

with greater legitimacy.

several prominent legislative supporters of health planning, coupled

with a high rate of turnover

made

CON

among

experienced members of the

program increasingly vulnerable to attacks from

ture of the program's legislative

patrons was

HSC

in the early 1990s,

its critics.

The depar-

particularly significant, for apart

prominent party and committee leaders, individual legislators had no personal
their disposal. In the context of a highly partisan legislature in

centrated in the hands of the

House and Senate

leadership,

from
staff at

which power was con-

members

actively sought

advice from lobbyists and colleagues with acknowledged policy expertise on complicated issues.
lature

54

With the retirement of

several prominent

CON

supporters from the legis-

and the replacement of experienced members of the Health Services Council in

grew steadily.
what Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk have described
55
as "the politics of ideas." During the 1980s, both industry groups and senior state
officials within the Department of Health embraced market-oriented, competitive solutions as the most effective means of controlling health care costs. Enrollment in managed care plans rose steadily after 1980; by 1994, Rhode Island, with 27.6 percent, had
the early 1990s, the influence of the hospital industry

Third,

CON

also fell victim to

the ninth highest rate of

was seen

HMO penetration in the nation. Entry regulation,

as a costly administrative burden

tive device that hospitals

by contrast,
on health providers and as an anticompeti-

could use to establish entry barriers for alternative delivery

systems. 56 In contrast to other states, projects proposed by noninstitutional providers
to CON review in Rhode Island; elsewhere, hospitals sought to circumvent the process by acquiring equipment in stages, collaborating with private physi57
cians, and establishing parent corporations.
CON programs, however, need not play a reactive role that stifles innovation. The
Rhode Island Department of Health initiated a request for proposals (RFP) process to
evaluate new submissions in identified areas of need in the late 1980s to assist institu-

were also subject

tions in long-range planning.

RFPs

for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), cardiac

catheterization units, rehabilitation services, and

the 1980s to

make

RFPs balanced

the state's

the

demand

CON process

for

new

on cost containment. In the case of

A

health care were issued during
in its orientation.

The use of

technologies with the state's continuing emphasis

MRI

cost-effective solution to the desire of
capabilities in the mid-1980s.

home

more proactive

facilities,

community

a nonprofit network emerged as a
hospitals to obtain advanced imaging

consortium of ten hospitals joined to share

nology through a mobile network that provided portable

MRI

MRI

tech-

units for each hospital at

two days per week. Participating hospitals were spared the full cost of building a
facility and hiring specialized staff, since radiologists employed by the network performed and analyzed MRIs at each hospital. The result was a compromise
acceptable to all parties, as the state's tertiary care centers were allowed to construct
permanent MRI facilities, and institutions in outlying communities were afforded access to the latest technology. The CON process simultaneously facilitated the diffusion
of new technology, minimized hospitals' financial obligations, and avoided unnecessary
least

permanent

duplication of equipment and health care personnel.

While a preset

ceiling

on moneys available for

capital projects such as the

can increase the effectiveness of capital-expenditure review,

CON

CONCAP

alone cannot bring

hospital costs under control, as capital projects account for only a small portion of institutions' total costs. Furthermore, as

Arnold Relman noted nearly a decade ago, "The
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chief cause of the cost crisis [in

American medicine]

is

not so

much

the price as the

ever increasing volume and intensity of medical services being provided in outpatient
58
Physicians exercise considerable control over the volume of
settings and hospitals."
services performed

by

hospitals;

economic analyses of physician and hospital behavior

over the past two decades by Joseph Newhouse, Mark Pauly, and others suggest that in
the absence of well-defined and commonly accepted protocols for treatment, doctors

can essentially "create demand" for profitable diagnostic and surgical procedures to
maximize their incomes. In fact, the president of the American College of Cardiology
confirmed

work

in

this suspicion

some of

when he noted

that "important

economic incentives are

at

59
these increases in rate of procedure utilization."

In recognition of the continued need for

some

regulation of health care capital ex-

penditures, both certificate of need programs and local health planning regained popularity in the early

repealed their

1990s after their more than a decade under siege. While some states

CON

legislation in the late 1980s, Delaware, Florida,

expanded the scope of

their

servers share Sapolsky's
trators,

CON programs between

view

that "physicians,

... the system

and more

was not much of an obstacle once

relevantly, hospital adminis-

certificate

principal historical shortcoming of state

much hope on

the consultants

were called

in to ad-

of capital expenditure regulation in Rhode Island

wisdom about

suggests that the prevailing

The

all

quickly discovered that the planning system could be outmaneuvered [and that]

vise," the cost-containment record

The

and Georgia

1989 and 1991. 60 While most ob-

of need has to be reexamined. 61

CON programs

was the placing of too

a program with multiple objectives to control health care costs.

proliferation of

new

technologies, from magnetic resonance imaging facilities to

cardiac catheterization labs, provides a constant reminder that new, often expensive

procedures that offer institutions lucrative opportunities to increase patient volume are
constantly being created.
struction after the

A number of states

imposed moratoria on new hospital conin 1986. Such actions, how-

end of federal health planning subsidies

ever, are blunt tools for controlling the diffusion of

new

technologies because they did

not discriminate between projects with proven clinical benefits and demonstrated need

CON

and

less essential proposals. In contrast,

new

technologies and the introduction of

mechanism

to evaluate the

desire to increase their

demand

for

imposes

rationality

on the diffusion of

new services by providing an institutional
new capital. In the absence of CON, hospitals'

market penetration and reputation through the acquisition of

promising new technologies and renovations of maternity and outpatient surgical
ties

facili-

has the potential to devolve into a technological arms race between competing

institutions.

Using recent studies as a benchmark,
guidelines developed by

state regulators are

outcome researchers

in evaluating

beginning to apply the

CON

applications based on

the appropriate utilization of existing services. Recent studies of the appropriate utilization of cardiac catheterization, coronary angioplasty,

and other specialized diagnostic
and therapeutic procedures in recent years have been driven, at least partially, by reimbursement. In particular, payer status
private insurance, Medicaid, self-pay
is

—

—

strongly associated with patients' utilization of health services. Studies of cardiac catheterization, carotid endarterectomy,

and coronary angiography found that many surgical

procedures were either "inappropriate" or of "uncertain" clinical value. 62 In the absence

of evidence that proposed services have a significant impact on patient outcomes, the
state may use the CON process to identify potentially unnecessary and costly
and discourage the overutilization of specialized and expensive procedures.
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facilities

.

-

.

Capital-expenditure review

is

likely to play a significant role in controlling costs

over the next decade, for after the demise of the Clinton administration's health care

reform package, the focus of attention has again shifted to the
experience with

CON

expenditure review, including an ongoing
applications,

states.

Rhode

Island's

provides evidence that a comprehensive approach to capital
facilities

planning process, "batch" review of

and a cap on capital-related operating expenditures, offers policymakers

an effective institutional mechanism to control costs. In the wake of mounting evidence
that the adoption of

new

technologies has fueled health care inflation over the past

decade, capital-expenditure review
levers to shape the organization

still

offers policymakers

and delivery of health care

one of the few
services.

institutional
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